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Almost each of the political forces and the great majority of the public saw no alter-
native to Euro-Atlantic integration, that is, accession to NATO and the EC (after
1992 the EU) when Hungary regained its independence in 1990. Membership in
both organizations had a number of internal and external implications too. Budapest
had to introduce sweeping reforms in practically all walks of life. Thus, for instance,
NATO-membership required the establishment of a parliamentary democracy, a
functioning market economy, and the observance of civil and human rights. At the
same time, Hungary had to sign so-called basic treaties with three of its neighbors in
which it again committed itself to peaceful relations and the renunciation of any at-
tempt to regain territories it had lost to the countries affected after the First and the
Second World Wars. EU-membership needed even more extensive restructuring of
the various Hungarian institutions from law enforcement through finances to social
services. In addition, Budapest expected that one of the major dilemmas of reconcil-
ing the so-called “Hungarian–Hungarian” question with the “good neighbor” policy
would be settled within the framework of European integration. The expectations on
behalf of the two sides have only been partially realized yet. Thus, Hungary consis-
tently spends much less on defense than the required level within the Atlantic Alli-
ance; Budapest has been trying to compensate with a relative prominent presence in
foreign missions. As for the EU, the threat of a “second class membership” has not
disappeared; in fact, after the beginning of the economic recession in 2008 it has
even become a more realistic perspective; in reality, Hungary has had to accept a
relative loss of power even in Central and Eastern Europe. However, Hungary has a
vested interest in a “Strong Europe” (this was the official slogan of Hungary’s
EU-Presidency during the first six months of 2011) in which “more Europe” should
not exclude the country’s closer relations with other regions in the world.
Keywords: foreign policy, security policy, NATO accession, EU accession, Hun-
garian relations, good neighbor policy
The Rationale for the Euro-Atlantic Integration after the Transition
If there was any consensus among the major political forces in Hungary after be-
coming free and independent again in 1989-90, it was about the – falsely la-
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belled – three “priorities” of Hungarian foreign policy: integration into the
Euro-Atlantic community, pursuing a “good neighbor” policy, and establishing
close “Hungarian to Hungarian” relationship, that is, intimate links between the
Hungarians within Hungary and the Hungarian minorities in the neighboring
states. In fact, the widely shared expectation was that the Euro-Atlantic integra-
tion would solve the other two outstanding issues as well, especially by “spiritual-
izing” the borders and by imposing such universal norms on the countries in Cen-
tral Europe as the observance of human and civil rights, including minority
(group) rights. However, this illusion of “pay one and get three” has not material-
ized yet for reasons which are partly internal and partly external.
Each government’s primary obligation is to provide for the security of the terri-
tory of the state and the people who live on it. Hungary’s security environment is
rather curious. On the one hand, geopolitically Hungary is an “indispensable” na-
tion in Central Europe to the extent that it is a link between the West and the East,
and the North and the South. However, on the other one, it has a relatively large
number of neighbors which have fallen into different categories from a security,
economic, political, social, religious, and cultural point of view. Some have be-
come members, just like Hungary, of both NATO and the EU; others have a good
chance of becoming members in the short term, and still others can hope to join
these organizations in the medium term. There is one, Ukraine, which is not likely
to get access to either of these institutions in the foreseeable future. Hungary can
also be said to be in the (semi)-periphery of Europe culturally, economically, and
historically alike, though geographically it occupies a central position. When the
Warsaw Pact ceased to exist, to a large extent because of the bold initiative taken
by then PM József Antall,1 Hungary found itself in a security “grey area”. The
multiethnic states around the country started to break up and there was no guaran-
tee whatsoever that the process would be peaceful. Though the separation of the
Czechs and the Slovaks was a “velvet divorce”, the breakup of Yugoslavia was
quite a different story. Besides the obvious military threats – in fact, both the Serb
and the Croat militaries repeatedly violated Hungarian airspace and territory dur-
ing their conflict –, Budapest had to be extremely cautious because of the sizable
Hungarian minorities in these two neighboring countries. The situation was made
even more sensitive by the fact that Hungary was among the first countries to rec-
ognize the independence of Croatia (and by assisting it with small firearms) at a
time when hundreds of thousands of ethnic Hungarians were living in Voivodina,
and Belgrade might have retaliated any time by moving against them. Moreover,
the first freely elected government of Hungary worried about the revival of the
Little Entente, that is, a close cooperation of neighbors with relatively substantial
Hungarian minorities at the expense of Hungary proper. The security situation in
Central Europe further threatened with a potential backlash in the dissolving So-
viet Union. In reality, the orthodox Communists’ coup in August 1991 sent a
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shiver down the spines of practically everyone in Central Europe. In addition, the
violence used by Soviet military forces in some Baltic states evoked painful mem-
ories of the role the Red Army had played in the region. In short, the geopolitical
situation demanded that Hungary should look for a solution that would resolve
these security dilemmas; and the logical and obvious choice was integration into
the Euro-Atlantic community.
While taking stock of the different theoretical and practical options, it became
incresingly clear that there was no alternative to joining the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. A modified alliance with the Soviet Union/Russia was out of ques-
tion for obvious reasons, and so was the restructuring of the Warsaw Pact. A Cen-
tral European regional security framework would have been a paper tiger. A Euro-
pean collective security organization (a sort of OSCE) was likewise deemed to be
too weak. In reality, the Cold War tacit agreement between the US and the Euro-
pean allies – that the Europeans were encouraged to build their welfare states un-
der an American security “umbrella” – resulted in a Europe which was not able to
handle the hard security challenges on its own – witness the Balkan crises in the
1990s. Relatively speaking, the arguments for neutrality were the strongest of the
alternatives to NATO membership; nevertheless, neutrality was not just a matter
of unilateral declaration but it was (and is) a matter of security guarantees ex-
tended by the great powers. Second, neutrality is much more expensive than mem-
bership in a defense alliance, and the Hungarian governments had to take the fi-
nancial considerations into account as well. The Antall-government also resisted
the syren sounds of the Russians: the so-called Kvitsinsky-formula would have
stipulated that neither country should join alliances which the other one might
find hostile.
Towards NATO-membership
The US grand strategy vis-à-vis Western Europe after World War II was to
de-territorialize, de-nationalize, and de-militarize the area. This mission was
given a new lease of life after 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe: all three mis-
sions were equally valid here. Moreover, the Clinton Administration developed a
new grand strategy towards the Old Continent: to make it “whole and free”. The
eventual integration of the post-Communist countries into the Atlantic commu-
nity also appealed to the liberal internationalist impulses in the Americans. The
“Perry Principles” incorporated such value criteria as well for membership as de-
mocracy and the civilian control of the military, besides a demand for a function-
ing market economy, settling border disputes, and NATO-compatibility of the
militaries. For the Central and Eastern Europeans the primary motif was, of
course, to enjoy the benefits of Article V of the Washington Treaty (basically
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American security guarantees) for two reasons. One, as Lech Walesa and Václav
Havel explained it to President Clinton, the Poles and the Czechs had been “be-
trayed and/or abandoned” repeatedly by the European great powers in the past
and, therefore, they did not trust them. Two, as the then Polish president meta-
phorically put it: “A bear is a bear.” The underlying message was clear: Russia
might be an impotent power for the time being but anything might happen in the
future.
Hungary seems to have taken a middle-of-the-road position with regard to a
potential revival of Russian expansionism. Poland and the Baltic states were voic-
ing fears from a resurgent Russia most loudly partly on account of their
geopolitical position. Paradoxically, a weak central power in Moscow might also
have meant an increased level of danger as forces not controlled by the govern-
ment might have provoked conflicts which potentially could have turned into ex-
istential threats given the so-called loose nukes. At the opposite end of the spec-
trum, there were countries such as the Czech Republic or Slovakia, which did not
feel threatened by Moscow in any way. Hungary was – and is — a moderate
Atlanticist country; it did not – and does not – blow a potential threat coming from
the East out of proportion, but it also calculated, and is calculating, with security
threats posed by Russia. The fact is that it is not any more the potential appearance
of the Red Army that justifies these feelings but the undeniable attempts by Mos-
cow to regain at least some of its former, predominantly economic, political, and
intelligence influence in the region.2 Nevertheless, American military presence, if
not for anything else but for a Cold War-type “tripwire” effect is preferred by the
Central and East Europeans in general and, by the majority of the Hungarians in
particular.
It is stating the obvious that NATO is primarily a defense organization. How-
ever, one should not discount its political and social dimensions either. The Perry
Principles incorporated the requirement of democracy and a functioning market
economy as well. In other words: the candidate countries had to “put their houses
into order” first. Democracy did not only mean regular parliamentary elections
but it also demands the observance of human and civil rights, the proper separa-
tion and control of the different branches of government, as well as a strong civil
society. In sum: the North Atlantic Organization is based on values and not only
interests – this fact explains to a large degree its successes so far. The candidate
countries, and even political forces within them which had not been previously fa-
mous for observing these rights, accelerated the political and economic transition
process in order to qualify for membership as soon as possible. Sometimes, they
had to push through painful economic reforms – the Hungarian Bokros-package
(named after the then Finance Minister) was one of the best examples. Two State
Department officials, Richard Holbrooke and Daniel Fried, and David Lipton
(from the Treasury Department) visited Hungary in early 1995 and during the dis-
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cussions with PM Gyula Horn they demanded that Hungary should take certain
steps if it wanted to get the support of the US for membership. The Socialist–Free
Democrat government, among others, introduced tough financial and economic
measures, banned arms sales to “rogue states”, and Gyula Horn indicated that they
would also like to settle the border and minority issues with Romania and
Slovakia.3 This latter question was especially important for the Clinton Adminis-
tration: what they valued was regional stability above everything else. Ultimately,
Hungary concluded a series of so-called basic treaties with Ukraine, Romania and
Slovakia in the first half of the 1990s despite the fact that Budapest had renounced
any territorial claims against its neighbors in the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947.
Washington insisted on having this reaffirment of the treaty obligations for fear of
“importing” a border dispute in Central Europe.
Nevertheless, different norms were demanded in the strictly military area too:
foremost among them is the civilian control of the military. The idea basically
goes back to Samuel P. Huntington’s suggestion of the dual control over the mili-
tary forces of the US – specifically by the legislative (Congress) and the executive
(the President).4 The introduction of the civilian control over the military was a
rather slow process in Hungary as it required changing a number of laws and regu-
lations both within the military hierarchy and in the relationship between the Pres-
ident and the National Assembly on one hand, and the military on the other one.
Besides, civilian control means transparency to the extent it does not threaten to
hurt national security, and the role of civil organizations had also to be found in
this complex relationship. In addition to these legal aspects, the real challenge was
the modernization and the downsizing of the military at the same time. Modern-
ization did not only incorporate making the equipment used by the Hungarian mil-
itary compatible with NATO standards, but it also required the changing of the
way of thinking of the officers as almost to a man they had been trained in Soviet
military facilities and, therefore, by default they had adopted a very different
mindframe from that of the officers serving in the various NATO countries.
Downsizing had two major aspects: first, some 160,000 people were serving in the
military at the end of the 1980s; the number was gradually cut to some 25,000 by
now – and the military has become a professional one as well. Second, the military
was “top heavy”, that is, there were proportionately too many officers and too few
NCOs and “rank-and-file”, plus too many people were sitting in offices instead of
being deployed elsewhere.
The Road to EU-membership
While NATO was regarded – justly – as primarily a defense organization, the Eu-
ropean Union (after the Maastricht Treaty in 1992) was seen a desirable model for
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the Central and East European countries from other points of view. The EU was
seen as an entity in which the inter-state relations were resting on cooperation, in-
terdependence, mutual understanding, and civic statehood. The core founding
idea of the EU (and its predecessors, the EEC and the EC) was reconciliation, the
transformation of neighbors into partners in a collective project. As the initial eco-
nomic integration was transformed into one with normative powers in almost all
walks of life, the expectation was that these norms would prevail in the states in
Central and Eastern Europe which had had historically a number of ethnic, reli-
gious, political, social, cultural, etc. tensions. In sum: (little) power politics would
be replaced with the same reconciliation that had characterized the history of the
West Europeans in the decades after 1945.
Hungary, so to speak, wished to kill not two but three birds with one stone with
an eventual EU-membership. One of them was further integration into the Euro-
Atlantic community; the second was the idea that within the EU the borders would
be “spiritualized”, therefore it would be easier to establish and maintain strong
links with the Hungarians living in the neighboring states – and even re-uniting
the nation culturally, even if political re-unification was absolutely out of ques-
tion. A widely shared expectation was that membership in the EU would impose
norms and standards in all East and Central European countries which would help
the prevailing of a range of human and civil rights, including group rights for mi-
norities. With respect to the latter question the consistent Hungarian position is
that strong and satisfied minorities are necessary for stable societies and, in turn,
enhance the cohesiveness of the European community too. In fact, this Hungarian
view does not enjoy support everywhere in Europe: the individual rights in the
name of a liberal ideology are preferred to group rights by the majority of the peo-
ple on the continent. At that time Hungary wanted to have the protection of minor-
ities incorporated into the “European Constitution” in 2005 but it failed because
of the strong opposition by, among others, the French.5 The underlying theoretical
consideration was a modified version of Rogers Brubaker’s so-called triadic
nexus, in which the matrix defining the position of a minority group incorporates
the following elements: the minority group, the “host” country, and the mother
country. The new factor added to these ones is the European Union as a normative
political entity, which is both an outside and an “inside” force in this context.6 (In
fact, former Foreign Minister Kinga Göncz reduced the affected actors in this con-
text to only the local Hungarian leaders and the majority society.) And third, the
popular belief was that membership in the EU would bring about a dramatic rise
of living standards overnight. In fact, none of these expectations has been realized
fully, and this may be the primary cause of a discernible disappointment with a
number of people with the EU and, in general, the Euro-Atlantic integration and
the increasing popularity of alternative ideas.
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If we take a closer look at this set of expectations, a historical dimension should
be introduced. There is no denying that the so-called trauma of Trianon is still
shaping the thinking of a large segment of the population in East and Central Eu-
rope. It must be emphasized that though, of course, it is primarily connected with
the Magyars (Hungarians), the post-World War I peace treaties, especially those
which contributed to the creation of formerly non-existent states such as Yugosla-
via and Czechoslovakia or enhanced the territories of others even beyond the
dreams of most of the people concerned (in Romania), still play a central role in
the respective national histories and myths. Therefore, practically no one in Cen-
tral Europe looks at the various political, economic or social questions as a de-
tached observer and, therefore, they acquire an emotional aspect as well. The
Hungarian leaderships wished to move beyond Trianon with the Euro-Atlantic in-
tegration but they sometimes bumped into a wall in their endeavors. The “Hungar-
ian card” is still a potent political tool in the hands of radical nationalists in some
of the neighboring countries and EU-membership has not put an end to the bitter
debates between them and the moderate forces both within and without their
countries.
The Hungarian vision of the future of the EU – partly based on the realization
that old hostilities die hard – was a “Europe of regions”, in which cross-border co-
operation in all walks of life prevails over a nationalist approach to international
relations. This idea rests on the concept of an enhanced form of cooperation
among countries which are located in the same region. Despite the fact that such
regional cooperations have been existing within the community (the oldest one
being that of the Benelux countries), those who would like to see a more federal-
ized Europe do not watch attempts towards this direction with approval and,
sometimes, especially the French leaders (Presidents Chirac and Sarkozy) have
even gone public with their reservations about such initiatives. Besides the “Eu-
rope of regions”, Hungary also had a vested interest in offering membership (or, at
least, the perspective of membership) to the neighboring countries. Budapest
wished to be “embedded” into the European community and to stop playing the
role of a frontier country – which it had been forced to do for centuries. Hungary
was afraid of the emergence of new fault lines within Europe; Budapest before the
accession and after that consistently supported (and supports) the idea that if a Eu-
ropean state wishes to join the Union and if it has met all the preconditions then it
should not be excluded from the community.
There was another grand strategic consideration behind Hungary’s aspiration
to become a member of the EU. Budapest considered a strong and united Europe a
vital partner in the transatlantic relationship and, by extension, in all matters
global as well. The underlying logic is that the liberal world order, which seems to
be the most beneficial to Hungary in spite of its numerous weaknesses, rests on a
strong bond between the two sides of the Atlantic Ocean. The strategic interests of
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the US and Europe coincide to a large extent. However, neither of them alone is
able to maintain the liberal world order and its institutions; in fact, even the two
together are not likely to have the required capabilities to do that, and they badly
need partners and/or allies in other regions of the world. However, the US and the
EU are the linchpins in this international order. To jump to conclusion: it is in the
interest of each European countries to make sure that the EU should be able to
play its role on the international stage. Such an EU should be strong and united;
despite the fact that Hungary is not one of the large countries, it belongs in the
group of medium-sized members, it should do its best to contribute to the emer-
gence of a strong and united Europe.
Hungary in NATO
Membership in NATO and the EU was considered to be complementary: as for-
mer Foreign Minister László Kovács put it, “More Europe does not mean less
America”. However, the dual membership has not resulted in a “win-win” situa-
tion for Hungary all the times; there happened cases when the country’s leaders
had to face tough decisions. Some of the root causes of this situation are simply
beyond the reach of the politicians in Budapest. If we should sum up the situation,
we may conclude that Hungary, in fact, wanted to join a different NATO than to-
day’s Atlantic Community and, to a lesser extent, a different EU than today’s Un-
ion. Likewise, the leading members of NATO, especially the US, expected differ-
ent things that Hungary has been able/willing to deliver so far, and so did some of
the most powerful forces in the EU. In other words: some of the expectations on
both sides have proved to be misplaced. In a few cases, they have derived from the
changed outside conditions and circumstances, and in some other ones one of the
sides has failed to live up to the expectations of the other side.
A defense organization such as NATO necessarily measures the performance
of its members within the framework of its contribution to the common defense.
During the accession talks with Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland, a large
number of experts and officials predominantly in the Realpolitik school repeat-
edly questioned the candidate countries’ capabilities to contribute to the common
defense efforts. The Hungarian military was relatively poorly equipped, led by of-
ficers who had been trained in the Soviet Union, and the infrastructure (military
and civilian alike) was not in the best shape either. The only asset Hungary was
bringing to the table was its geopolitical position; more specifically, its vicinity to
the Balkans. Hungary’s territory was ideal for NATO support activities (a staging
area), but besides it there was not too much else Budapest was able to bring to the
table. It was more than likely that Hungary would be a consumer of security to a
larger degree than a provider of security.
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The size and the equipment of the military were both practically negligible at
the time of joining NATO in March 1999. Since then it has turned out that this sit-
uation is not likely to change any time in the foreseeable future. As a general Euro-
pean tendency, Hungary has also cut back its defense expenditure; though about
two percent of the GDP should be spend on defense-related issues, the current
(2011) defense spending is barely one percent of the GDP. The Hungarian gov-
ernment indeed promised to raise defense spending at the time of the accession to
this level; then the same promise was made at the Prague Summit in 2002. Next
year, then Defense Minister Ferenc Juhász again committed Hungary to achieve
the two percent level by 2006 – the series of empty promises somewhat exasper-
ated the political-military-security establishment in the US. (It must be mentioned
that Washington has been demanding more resources from practically all the Eu-
ropean allies in the name of burden sharing since the Lisbon Summit in 1951.) It is
not only the amount of money that has disappointed people in NATO. The organi-
zation requires its members to develop homeland defense capabilities; Budapest,
especially in the past few years, have not done too much in this field. (This trend
may have started to change slowly since May 2011: more attention has been paid
to, for instance, the training of reserve forces than previously.) The single most
important step towards modernization proved to be rather controversial: the leas-
ing of 14 Gripen fighter aircraft in 2001 has been eating up a substantial portion of
the Hungarian defense budget and the value added of a few fighter aircraft to the
thousands operated by the other NATO members is questionable. The expedition-
ary capabilities have also been repeatedly criticized; the Hungarian governments
have tried to balance the negative views by deploying the constitutionally allowed
maximum number of troops, especially in the Balkans and Afghanistan.
The major problem seems to be the changing mission of NATO. Hungary was
doing its best to get admitted into the organization in order to leave a security gray
zone and to acquire hard security guarantees against any potential outside threat.
Nevertheless, such threats seem to have disappeared and, instead, NATO was
evolving into an organization engaged in the creation and defense of zones of sta-
bility – and not exclusively military one. This emphasis on “out-of-area” opera-
tions do not sit well with the Hungarian political elite and the people at large alike;
it is very telling that the East and Central European states, including of course
Hungary, were among the most vocal supporters of keeping Article 5 of the Wash-
ington Treaty as the core mission of NATO’s new strategy accepted in Lisbon in
2010. In general, most of the people in Hungary seem to think of security in the
conventional sense and do not accept the extended interpretation of security –
which is one of the by-products of globalization, which, in turn, is not a popular
term among large segments of the population either.
Hungary’s position within NATO has been downgraded for outside reasons as
well; one may conclude that all of them have been beneficial for the security of the
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country. First and foremost, it seems that the armed conflicts, the ethnic
cleansings and wars in the Balkans belong to the past. Hungary was fulfilling an
important role in the NATO operations both at the Bosnian and the Kosovo crises.
The Taszár air base was instrumental in controlling the airspace over the Western
Balkans and it also served as a staging area for troops to be deployed in Southeast
Europe. In reality, the Hungarian governments took relatively great risk with this
support activity because of the presence of a sizable Hungarian minority in
Voivodina. However, after the conclusion of the hostitilies and the beginning of
the peacekeeping missions, in which Hungarian military units from military po-
lice to engineering ones have been taking place, the Taszár air base was shut
down. With the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to NATO, the Atlantic Alli-
ance got access to military facilities (air bases, ports) which are closer to the po-
tential trouble spots. The gradual integration of the countries in Southeast Europe
into NATO and the EU means that one of the major potential security threats to
Hungary has been eliminated. Moreover, the widely criticized division of labor
within NATO has also weakened the American interest in the region. While the
US forces bore the brunt of the military operations (for instance, the USAF flew
some 70 percent of the approximately 36,000 sorties in Spring 1999), the Europe-
ans gradually took over the peacekeeping tasks.7 The end result is that Hungary
has become more and more “embedded” into the EU and NATO and, therefore,
does not need a special attention in the NATO Headquarters. Hungary has been
left on the sidelines during the recent debates over the deployment of elements of
the missile defense (MD) system. The Bush Administration was trying to deploy a
radar station in the Czech Republic and a number of anti-ballistic missile batteries
in Poland. The Obama Administration scrapped these ideas and instead is pushing
for a layered defense system with some Patriots in Poland but other elements of
the MD are to be constructed in Romania – these two countries seem to be occupy-
ing the top spots for the American strategists in East and Central Europe.
The Hungarian contribution to the common defense against the various secu-
rity challenges is rather modest. Hungary is playing host to a transport wing of a
few C-17s at Pápa. The country is supposed to have three 3D radar stations which
are integrated into NATO’s early warning system; the site of the third one has
been in the center of controversies between the environment protectionists and the
Ministry of Defense (MoD). At long last it seems that a suitable site has been
found and the construction of the third radar station may begin soon. The govern-
ments of Hungary have been trying to balance the lower than promised defense
budgets and other deficiences in the modernization of the military and the force
structure, as well as the poor homeland defense capabilities by sending the consti-
tutionally allowed maximum number of troops (1,000) abroad to the various
NATO missions. The NATO leaders publicly express their appreciation of the
Hungarian efforts, but privately they repeatedly give voice to their frustration and
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disappointment with the gap between the promises and what actually Budapest
has delivered.8 In short: Hungary does not seem to have made the passage from a
consumer of security to a provider of security yet.
A Second-class Membership in the EU?
The core strategic goal of EU-membership for Hungary is to get from the
“(semi)periphery” of Europe into the core. One may come to conclusion without
any exaggeration that this expectation has not been fulfilled yet. For a start, Hun-
gary, together with the other new members in May 2004, did not enjoy all the four
freedoms which constitute the pillars of the EU. Though the free movement of the
capital and the people was granted, it was only three countries (Ireland, Sweden,
and the UK) that opened their labor market (free movement of labor), and the
scare of the “Polish plumber” in France and other old members of the EU (free
movement of services) is also well-known. Besides, Hungarian agricultural prod-
ucts received only a quarter of the subsidies farmers got for their products in the
old member states (although the government was allowed to add an additional 30
percent subsidy out of the state budget). In truth, there were so-called derogations
as well: Hungary was allowed to introduce certain measures only after the expira-
tion of a period of time. One of the most sensitive such issues was the free sale of
lands; the Hungarian government succeeded in securing a relatively long period in
which it was allowed to prevent them from being bought up by foreign nationals.
(In fact, there are loopholes in the laws and large portions of lands have been ac-
quired through, for instance, “pocket deals”, especially by Austrians in the west of
Hungary.)
The first Orbán-government believed that Hungary would join the eurozone in
four or five years, by the middle of the 2000s. However, the incoming Social-
ist-Free Democrat coalition started to put it off; in fact, it had to as Hungary was
getting farther and farther away from meeting the Copenhagen criteria. They,
among others, require that the national debt should not exceed 60 percent of the
GDP; it stood at 53 percent when the first Orbán-government stepped down, and
when the second one took office eight years later in the spring of 2010, the debt
was above 80 percent. The inflation rate was consistently higher than allowed in
the first decade of the 21st century. At the moment, the official target date is 2020,
but given the troubling consequences of the economic crisis and the subsequent
grave financial situation in Ireland, Greece, and Portugal (and similar possible
outcomes in other countries, especially Spain and Italy), the future of the euro it-
self has become less certain than it was a few years ago. Nevertheless, with the
so-called economic governance and the European semester, both of which are
aimed at imposing tighter control on the economies and finances of the member
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states, one potential consequence may be the emergence of a truly two-speed Eu-
rope – “truly” in the sense that the EU is not composed of absolutely equal mem-
bers even at the moment.
Hungary experienced what dilemmas membership in the EU and NATO might
convey. The question was exposed relatively early during the NATO accession
talks when François Leotard, the then French Defense Minister made the com-
ment that if one country knocked at the door of NATO, then it practically meant
that it knocked at the door of the US. He added that what they really wanted was
that the Central European countries would ask for security guarantees from the
Western European states.9 On the eve of the war on Iraq in early 2003, a number of
European leaders expressed their public support of the American position in the
question. The rather rude and undiplomatic rebuke arrived immediately: then
President Jacques Chirac declared that the participating East and Central Euro-
pean politicians had missed an opportunity to “shut up” and he complained about
the defective “upbringing” of these people as well. This patronizing mentality was
inherited by Nicholas Sarkozy, who lectured the Visegrad countries on the unity
of the EU when the four Central Europeans discussed the possibility of reconcil-
ing their positions before certain EU-summits.10 (This is a practice regularly exer-
cised by France and Germany, or the Benelux countries.) The message was clear:
there are “more equals” in the EU than the rest. This inequality can also be seen on
other levels: for example, the currently forming European External Action Ser-
vice staff is heavily biased in favor of the old members. On a more general level,
especially with regard to the Europeans’ attitude towards the US and Russia, one
can see not so invisible dividing lines: while the Central and East Europeans, on
the whole, are more Atlanticist and more skeptical towards Moscow, the Western
half of continental Europe, again on the whole, entertains reverse sentiments.
Much hope was pinned on the Schengen-regime in Hungary. Besides being
able to enjoy the benefits of the free movement of people, it was also seen as a use-
ful tool in the re-unification of the Hungarian nation culturally and partly econom-
ically too. Nevertheless, certain steps taken by the first and second Orbán-govern-
ments have raised – basically unfounded – suspicions in some of the neighboring
countries. The first such issue was the so-called status law, which would have
given a number of rights (including health care, education, etc.) to ethnic Hungari-
ans who lived outside of Hungary. The question was coupled with an inherent sus-
picion nurtured by a few political forces in the neighboring countries against the
center-right political forces in Hungary. Strong protests were triggered in, for in-
stance, Romania when PM József Antall declared that he wished to be the Prime
Minister of 15 million Hungarians in spirit. Any mention of the unity of Hungari-
ans within the Carpathian Basin is a red rag to nationalist forces in Slovakia,
Ukraine, Romania and Serbia in the first place. Moreover, the center-right politi-
cal parties in Hungary have always stressed that they supported the cultural, and,
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possibly, political autonomy of the ethnic Hungarians in these countries – if and
when the rightful representatives of the Hungarian minorities also shared this stra-
tegic goal. In reality, this issue has driven another wedge between the center-right
and the left-of-center political forces in Hungary and, unfortunately, this division
is mirrored within the Hungarian minorities in the affected countries. On a higher
political level, the EU does not support or does not condemn autonomies; it sim-
ply refers to these issues to the appropriate countries’ competencies. On another
level, the great powers out of Realpolitik considerations are not very enthusiastic
about the Hungarian efforts at gaining autonomy because they see it as a potential
source of instability inside NATO and EU member states.
Another issue which gave rise to criticism from various quarters was the re-
peated attempts by the first and second Orbán-governments to find, at least, sym-
bolic redress for the grievances of ethnic Hungarians who found themselves out-
side of Hungary proper after World War I. PM Orbán believes that there is no suc-
cessful Euro-Atlantic policy without regional stability; while a successful EU in-
tegration does not only strengthen regional security and cooperation, but it also
creates an opportunity to settle the question of the Hungarians beyond the borders.
The first attempt was the introduction of the so-called status law which wished to
give preferential treatment to ethnic Magyars who lived outside of the mother
country. Though Hungary was not a member of the EU yet at the introduction of
the law, the major argument against it was that within the EU – at least nominally
– there can be no discrimination between citizens of the community; that is, every-
one should enjoy equal rights in all walks of life. Upon assuming power again in
2010, the Orbán-government did not waste time in introducing a bill into the Hun-
garian National Assembly about National Cohesion. The law itself condemns any
attempt directed at assimilation of national minorities; moreover, it reinforces
Hungary’s commitment to support the efforts of the members and communities of
the nation to maintain links with each other and to their natural rights to gain vari-
ous forms of group autonomies in accordance of the practices accepted in Europe.
Next, the National Assembly passed a law on the extension of dual citizenship. As
it happened a few days before the parliamentary elections in Slovakia, the law
gave another excuse for the nationalists (such as the SNS) to play out the “Magyar
card”. The law was accepted in the other neighbors without any comments (in
fact, it was partly modeled on a similar measure taken by the Romanian legisla-
tive). The bone of contention between Budapest and Bratislava is whether the ex-
tended dual citizenship law has extraterritorial validity or nor. On one hand, the
EU renders all questions related to citizenship under the authority of the members
states and, on the other one, quite a few EU-states (Italy, Portugal, Romania, etc.)
do have dual citizenship. The real problem seems to be political and historical:
certain countries in Central Europe are especially sensitive about citizenship as
well as autonomy because they fear that these would be only the first steps to-
HUNGARY’S INTEGRATION INTO THE EURO-ATLANTIC COMMUNITY 261
wards secession. (That is the prime reason why Romania and Slovakia do not rec-
ognize Kosovo as an independent state; they are afraid of “sanctioning” a prece-
dent.) On a higher level, the opponents to the Hungarian status law and the ex-
tended dual citizenship law claim that they are unneccessary because the EU has
“spiritualized” the borders (de-territorialized the continent). In addition, they fear
that the disputes generated by these measures between EU-members would
weaken the cohesion of the community and threaten the realization of the dream
of a “Europe whole and free”. The measures, especially the latter one, have con-
tributed to the opening of another division line between the ethnic Magyar politi-
cal parties in Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Ukraine alike. Moreover, a new alter-
native appeared in Slovakia in the form of the Híd-Most (Bridge) party, which is a
Hungarian-Slovak party and lured away quite a number of votes from the ethni-
cally “pure” Magyar Koalíció Pártja (Party of Hungarian Coalition) at the recent
parliamentary elections in Slovakia. There is a possibility that similar ethnically
mixed parties will be formed in, for instance, Romania and Serbia and the local
Magyar communities will not only be divided along lines mirroring the political
spectrum in the mother country, but they will also be split along the lines of pro-
moting “pure” Hungarian parties versus ethnically mixed ones in their “host”
countries.
Conclusions
Hungary has become a member of both NATO and the EU – on paper the single
most important goal identified after the fall of communism by the overwhelming
majority of the political elite and the people at large alike has been achieved. The
integration into the EU and the trans-Atlantic cooperation are two sides on the
same coin; neither can be imagined without the other one. Moreover, with the
similar integration of most of neighbors and the stabilization of the situation in
Southeast Europe the regional circumstances have also improved to a large extent;
Hungary has practically been “embedded” in the Euro-Atlantic community. The
country does not face any serious or, let alone, existential threat. Budapest has met
the bulk of the political, economic, and value standards and norms which were
preconditions of accession.
Hungary has benefited enormously from membership in the two organizations.
NATO provides the vital security guarantee without which Hungary’s domestic
and international positions would be unquestionably worse than they are today. At
the same time, the normative power of the Alliance should not be discounted ei-
ther; it urged on Hungary to adopt far-reaching domestic reforms and to conclude
important international agreements, especially with some of the neighboring
states. However, the successive governments’ promise that Hungary would be-
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come a provider of security instead of a consumer of security has not been realized
yet despite occasional serious efforts by the troops on the field. The force structure
should be further modernized, and so should the capabilities of the military. Hun-
gary has been spending far less on the country’s defense capabilities than is ex-
pected from her.11 Though Budapest is doing relatively well as regards foreign
missions, it still has not lived up to the expectations and promises. In a deeper
sense, the real problem seems to a divergence between the visions of the future of
the Alliance and the threat perception in Washington and most of the European
capitals, including Budapest. It does seem that the NATO Hungary wanted to join
and the NATO it actually joined are two different organizations. The former was
closer to the NATO of the Cold War, that is, a basically territorial defense organi-
zation with clear-cut circumstances under which it would take action. The latter
one is an organization which is, to some extent, in search of a mission; the
“out-of-area” operations and the new, extended concept of security do not mesh
so well with the Hungarian ideas of security than the “old” NATO’s strategy. The
political elite has found it politically too sensitive to initiate a serious public de-
bate on security in a globalized world, and now it would amount to almost a politi-
cal suicide to divert some of the already scarce resources to defense related issues.
Hungary is not alone in this question: most of the European members of NATO
have to face a similar situation. Hungary’s contribution alone does not make or
break the Alliance; nevertheless, Budapest can contribute positively and nega-
tively alike to the emergence of a critical mass and, thus, may influence the future
of NATO in the final analysis.
Hungary has completed an important phase of integration into the EU with its
Presidency in the first six months of 2011. The professionalism of the different
branches of the government which were managing the EU-affairs in cooperation
with the appropriate officials in the various EU-institutions from the European
Commission to the European Parliament earned high grades from the observers.
This recognition of the achievements of Hungary was all the more timely as Hun-
gary had become one of the first “sick men” of Europe in 2008 when the country
had to be bailed out by the IMF, the EU and the EBRD. Nevertheless, there are ar-
eas in which Hungary cannot claim to be belonging in the core of the EU. One
such question is membership in the euro-zone. Though the hasty introduction of
the euro is definitely not in the interest of Budapest, the majority expert opinion is
that in the medium and long term it would be safer to adopt the euro as a currency
for not only financial, but also political reasons. Though the elbow room of the
governments to stimulate either demand or supply, or to inflate of deflate the na-
tional currency in harmony with the changing economic environment would be
more limited that at the moment, the stability of the currency might offset these
consequences. Another step towards further integration into the EU is the mem-
bership perspective of Hungary’s neighbors in the Western Balkans, while Roma-
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nia and Bulgaria are likely to join the Schengen regime in the foreseeable future.
At the same time, the Eastern Neighborhood project seems to be suffering set-
backs, partly as a consequence of the “Arab Spring” and, thus, the “upgrading” of
the Southern Neighborhood policy. The territory between Russia and the EU con-
tinues to be a “gray area” – which is not in Hungary’s interest. On the other hand,
the integration of energy policies within the EU by 2014 as well as the common
efforts in Central Europe to diversify energy resorces and transit systems are very
promising and advance Hungary’s strategic goals. Hungary cannot only contrib-
ute to the creation of a “Strong Europe” (which was the Presidency’s key mes-
sage) by furthering European projects, though; a more important contribution is
the creation of a strong and stable economic, political and social environment at
home.
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